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ABSTRACT 
The collection and analysis data on hazardous air traffic management (ATM) 
incidents is an important task.  Expert judgement about such incidents needs to be 
carried out within a systematic and consistent safety framework.  The mark of the 
genuine safety expert is to be able to ask the right questions concerning potential 
accidents.   
 
Hazards and risks are not ‘facts’ or ‘events’ that ‘exist’, but rather judgements made 
about conditional futures and their consequences.  A hazardous situation is one in 
which the outcome was not ‘system controlled’, with some potential outcomes having 
significant negative consequences”.  System controls in this sense cover all the 
means by which the system is held stable (= defended) against the potential 
negative consequences. 
 
The ATM system can be (over-) simplified to consist of three structural system layers 
acting as the system controls: Planning (pre-operational), Operation (the flight in 
progress), and Alert (the ground and air protection enabled by conflict alert systems, 
on which the controller/pilot will act).  A hazardous event is one in which a high 
degree of conflict between aircraft is observed plus a low confidence that the 
remaining system layers would generally provide the necessary corrective action.   
1. INTRODUCTION 
Aviation’s safety track record demonstrates that it is an industry whose people are 
focused on continuous improvement.  The prime safety goal of the air traffic 
management (ATM) of en route commercial flights is to reduce the risk of mid-air 
collisions.  Safety has improved to such an extent that collisions are now rare, so 
collecting data on hazardous ATM Incidents has therefore always been seen as an 
important task.  This incident data, collected consistently, can be viewed as a key 
indicator of the ‘health’ of the ATM system.  Incidents can provide insights into the 
frequency of known error and failure types, and also enable new types to be 
detected.  Analyses of the processes and characteristics of incidents provide insights 
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into potential system design weaknesses.  Moreover, planned changes to the system 
to improve safety can be tested against such incidents to demonstrate that risk is 
being reduced.  [NB: ‘risk’ is often used in safety analyses as a combination of 
frequency of occurrence and its severity: in the following, the accidents always have 
the same severity – an accident with many fatalities.] 
 
A large variety of crucial – and intrinsically difficult – safety questions can be asked 
about ATM incidents: 
Which incidents should be judged the most important to ATM system safety?   
Which incidents give most guidance about potential accidents?   
In what ways should incidents be categorised and analysed to help pinpoint 
key safety issues?   
Are ‘minor’ incidents of any safety importance? 
How should the relevant importance of different incidents be assessed or 
weighted to provide a true picture of the health of the ATM safety system?   
This paper attempts to make a start – no more than that – in answering these kinds 
of questions.  Interpretation of incident data needs a systematic and consistent 
safety framework.  Without such a framework, it is difficult to gain the desired 
insights into system design weaknesses that have the potential for accidents.  There 
is little point in collecting and categorising a great deal of data, unless it is analysed 
in a way that systematically reveals the safety lessons that help to reduce the 
likelihood of potential future accidents.   
 
The aim here is to try to ensure that expert judgement about ATM incidents can be 
carried out within a systematic and consistent safety framework, rather than 
producing formulaic prescriptions.  The focus is how the system can be improved 
rather than the whys of causes.  System jargon is avoided: the approach is mainly 
through an ‘ordinary language’ analysis of safety terms and logic, plus some 
metaphors to describe the key features of a safe ATM system.   
 
The following text consists of six sections: 
2. The Nature of Hazardous ATM Events 
3. ATM System Layers and Risk Probabilities 
4. Airproxes, Hazards and System Layers 
5. Discussion 
6. Conclusions 
2. THE NATURE OF HAZARDOUS ATM EVENTS 
There are several different – and complementary – ATM incident systems in use in 
the UK.  Airproxes derive from pilot and controller reports, and are the province of 
the UK Airprox Board [UKAB] (1999- ).  The Civil Aviation Authority’s (CAA) Safety 
Regulation Group (SRG) has a Mandatory Occurrence Reporting scheme, which 
covers all kinds of aviation incident not just ATM-related ones (CAA, 2003).  National 
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air traffic Services Ltd (NATS) records inter alia, data on Short Term Conflict Alert 
(STCA) and Separation Monitoring Function (SMF) monitoring (eg NATS (2004)). 
 
What actually is an ATM incident?  To start this analysis, consider a frequently used 
phrase about ATM incidents: ‘hazardous’.  A dictionary definition is on the lines of: 
hazardous: “anything which might cause an accident, create danger, etc” 
This is a complex statement.  It has three important elements: 
“might” – this is a future conditional statement, referring to a possible future 
“cause” – some chain of related events is being considered 
“accident/danger” – there are significant negative consequences 
Thus, when something is referred to as being hazardous, this is actually a statement 
about something that will happen (or is the process of happening) that could have 
significant negative penalties to the participant(s) or other individuals. 
 
Some examples help to illustrate these different elements (these will also be used in 
the further development of the concept).  To walk a tightrope would be hazardous 
because an inexperienced person would be likely to fall of it (but not so for an 
experienced and healthy circus performer).  Driving a car on an icy road around a 
corner could be hazardous because the driver’s knowledge about the road’s friction 
would not be as good as in normal conditions, and so the driver might fail to steer the 
vehicle safely.  It would be hazardous for a pilot to adopt a markedly non-standard 
phraseology when communicating with a controller because this could lead to a 
misunderstanding about the route the aircraft should follow, and hence possibly 
produce a flight path conflicting with other aircraft. 
 
Thus, the word hazardous cannot properly be used about events that have already 
occurred.  There is no conditionality about past events: the tightrope was walked, the 
car was driven, etc.  What people are often commenting on is the hazard involved in 
some kind of similar event in the future.  Thus, walking a tightrope is a hazardous 
thing for people to do because the next person to attempt it may fall off – or perhaps 
the person after that, etc.  Sometimes, cars that are to be driven on icy roads will 
lead to an accident.  Sometimes, there will be occasions when poor voice discipline 
by aircrew can lead to a mid-air collision.   
 
Not all future things presently viewed as hazardous will actually turn out to have 
negative consequences – some non-acrobats will be able to walk the tightrope, etc.  
The likelihood of the negative consequences will depend on factors such as the 
participant’s skills, the environment and safety mechanisms.  Thus, the tightrope 
walking will be much more difficult for the average 90-year-old non-acrobat, and the 
pilot’s poor communication may not lead to danger if the controller detects the choice 
of the wrong course.  Sometimes, the negative consequences are avoided by a 
deterministic (ie definitely present) measure, eg the traffic police might have set a 
special speed limit for the icy road and are monitoring every driver.  In other 
instances (eg the controller monitoring the aircraft), there will be probabilistic 
elements involved, so that, on some proportion of occasions, the negative penalties 
will occur and the rest of the occasions it will not. 
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This suggests a definition of a past ‘hazardous situation’: 
hazardous situation: “one in which the outcome was not ‘system controlled’, 
with some potential outcomes having significant negative consequences” 
The phrase ‘system controlled’ means something like: 
system controlled: “the ability to determine the outcome against reasonably 
foreseen changes and variations of system parameters, such as the abilities 
of the participant(s), the environment (in the largest sense), and the safety 
mechanisms in place. 
System controls in this sense cover all the means – the effective feedbacks – by 
which the system is held stable (= defended) against the potential negative 
consequences: designers, pilots, controllers, software engineers, etc – not just the 
operational controller.  What is preventing an unsafe system state from persisting?   
 
A failure of system control covers both of these kinds of mistake, where the 
mechanisms make the situation worse, and when they essentially fail to intervene 
(eg a conflict alert system could fail either by putting the aircraft into more danger or 
by not alerting).  The new phrase here is ‘reasonably foreseen’.  This means that the 
assessment of hazard is not to be carried out against ‘unreasonable’ system 
parameters.  What is unreasonable is a matter for debate and convention.  In the 
example of the driver on the icy road, if the driver had a great deal of experience of 
driving in such conditions, then it might be reasonable for him or her to assume that 
the road friction was no worse than he had previously encountered.  Phrased 
another way, to say that a past situation was hazardous implies that if some of the 
system parameters applicable during that situation had been ‘slightly different’ or 
‘reasonably perturbed’ then significant negative consequences would have resulted.  
Something was hazardous because of what might have happened.   
 
This idea, that system control is a key thought, has already been adopted in safety 
assessment of operational ATM systems.  To quote (ARIBAa): 
“In general, a (sub)process is named controllable if it has the property that its 
behaviour can always be steered from an undesirable sequence of events to 
another, more desirable, one.  Opposite to controllable (sub)processes are 
(sub)processes that have the property that once the initial state is known, the 
future evolution of the (sub)process is completely determined.  This type of 
(sub)process is named autonomous.” 
 
But is this the correct understanding of a concept such as ‘hazardous incident’?  This 
‘ordinary language’ approach seems to be consistent with the dictionary definitions of 
related words – Appendix A.  The definitions in Appendix A share the underlying 
ingredients detected in the word ‘hazardous’.  Thus, the future conditional tense for 
is implied by phrases such as ‘likely to’, ‘possibility’, and ‘depending on chance’.  
Hazards and risks are not ‘actual’ things – ‘facts’ or ‘events’ that somehow ‘exist’ – 
but rather judgements made about conditional futures and their consequences, given 
a lack of information about current system parameters and further events.  This 
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judgement (or perception or opinion) is about the degree of possibility of some 
unpleasant state of things that may come into existence at some future time.   
 
There is no such thing as ‘actual risk’ unless it is interpreted in this way: combining 
the definitions above only produces sense if there is this kind of interpretation.  [A 
simple test is to try to explain a putative conceptual phrase such as ‘actual risk’ to 
someone – what kind of thing would it consistently describe?  The logical 
implications of terms such as ‘hazard’ have generated considerable interest by 
safety and computing researchers, eg Ladkin (1998).] 
 
Thus, the conclusion is that, whenever attempts are made to classify incidents in 
terms of risk, these should be 'what if' exercises.  The central message is that 
hazards and risks are judgements, which implies the need to put in place a 
framework and processes that ensure that the experts are asked to make the most 
valuable judgements in safety terms.  The implication of this to ATM incident analysis 
is picked up again in latter sections: first, a new description of the ATM system is 
needed in the next section.   
3. ATM SYSTEM LAYERS AND RISK PROBABILITIES 
For an ATM System, the ‘system control’, as described in the previous section, can 
be the responsibility of a new concept: ‘system layers’.  The present ATM system 
has evolved over the decades.  It has several distinct components in its operational 
and technical concept.  In roughly their date order of introduction, these are.   
Controllers and pilots – people are an integral part of the whole system. 
Formal Safety Rules – for the control of traffic, including the minimum 
separation to be permitted between aircraft. 
Radio Telephony – communication between controllers and pilots (only 
introduced shortly before World War II). 
Controlled Airspace – the creation of sectors, volumes of airspace, each 
handled by a controller team, with a small number of routes; civil commercial 
traffic is separated from general aviation and military aircraft.   
Flight Progress Strips – paper strips, generated by the flight plan computer 
and kept on plastic holders in ordered racks, which are used to record the 
details of a flight – being changed to electronic versions. 
Radar – processed Secondary Surveillance Radar (SSR) is now used, with 
the displayed aircraft symbols complemented by callsign and height 
information, passed down from aircraft transponders.  [Not is use in oceanic 
airspace – ATC is supplied with position reports from the on-board navigation 
systems.] 
Computer Processing – of radar and flight data. 
High Quality Aircraft Navigation – progressively improved from VOR/DME 
to Inertial Navigation Systems through to satellite-based aids such GPS. 
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STCA – the computer processing system has the facility for analysing SSR 
tracks to predict if aircraft might come into close proximity in the near future 
and, if they do, warn the controller by flashing a message on his radar screen. 
Airborne Collision Avoidance System ACAS – On board collision 
avoidance system based on detection of other aircraft in the vicinity carrying 
SSR transponders.  These tell the pilot of nearby traffic – TA (Traffic Advisory) 
– and aircraft coming into conflict – RA (Resolution Advisory).  RAs tell the 
pilot to climb or descend as appropriate to take it out of risk.  [NB: ACAS is the 
generic term – used here.  TCAS – Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance 
System – is a commercially available version of ACAS.]  
 
For present purposes, these can be grouped as follows: 
 
Safe Route Design 
Formal Safety Rules 
Controlled Airspace 
Technical Infrastructure 
Radio Telephony 
Radar  
High Quality Aircraft 
Navigation 
Computer Processing 
Flight Progress Strips 
Planning Controller 
Flying Pilot 
Controlling Controller 
Ground Protection  
STCA 
Controller and Pilot 
Air Protection  
ACAS 
Pilot 
Figure 1. ATM System Components - illustrative 
Figure 2 then shows, in a very abstract and simplified fashion, the dynamical transit 
of a typical flight – in ATM system terms – through these structural system layers.  
The three pre-operational – Planning – layers have been grouped together because 
they are highly related, eg separation minima depend on suitable equipment being 
available, while the controller has to work within the safety constraints using the 
equipment.  The picture is very simplified: for example, flight scheduling and flow 
management should be included in Planning.  The Operation Layers cover the 
activities of pilots and controllers while the flight is in progress.  The Alert Layer is the 
ground and air protection enabled by STCA and ACAS, on which the controller/pilot 
will act.  The assumption that a flight goes through these layers in one sequence is 
too simple; in reality, there are complex feedback loops. 
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Figure 2. The ATM system layers – highly simplified, without ‘loops’ 
But what do these layers actually accomplish in terms of system risks?  The answer 
is that they act systematically to reduce mid-air collision risk by ‘shuffling the risk 
pack’.  The purpose of the system layers is to change the statistical distribution of 
risks.  A formal structure is imposed by the Planning Layers, next the Operation 
Layer should then eliminate inherent conflicts (but note that the Planning Layer does 
not produce conflict free paths from departure to landing), and then the Alert Layer 
warns the controller and pilot about impending conflicts.   
 
Figure 3 illustrates the risk structure – the frequencies of flights having particular 
‘degree of conflict’ (Dc) values – of a large number of flights being processed by 
these layers, measured at two of the ‘slice’ points I to IV in the transit shown in 
Figure 2.  [The term ‘degree of conflict’ is used because of similarities with related 
phrases adopted by researchers assessing STCA and ACAS.] 
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Figure 3. Statistical distribution of Dc in a large population of flights 
The full line curve A shows a comparatively risky set of flights: some have very high 
values – off the scale – and the number of flights with zero Dc value is not that high.  
The dashed curve B is a much better profile: there is a maximum Dc value and most 
flights at near to zero Dc value.  The job of the ATM system layers is to improve type 
A distributions so that they become type Bs: fewer high degrees of conflict and more 
of the lower degrees of conflict). 
 
The ‘starting population’ of flights in Figure 3 could be all those that operated on a 
given day in a given airspace.  But most of the pairs of flights fly at different times in 
different geographical areas.  As these aircraft are too far apart in time and/or space 
ever to pose a risk to each other, they are excluded from the analysis – they have 
‘zero degree of conflict’ (or most precisely, ‘negligible’ in any practical sense).  The 
bulk of flights are to be found in the very long tail near to this ‘zero degree of conflict’.  
(For a given traffic pattern, there is an upper limit to the number of conflicts: it is 
certainly bounded above – by all aircraft being instantaneously in conflict with all 
other aircraft.)  Those significant conflicts that exist are comparatively few in number, 
and are generally confined to those flights operating at about the same time and in 
particularly heavily loaded airspace sectors.   
 
On what kind of scale is this, so far vaguely described, degree of conflict Dc to be 
measured?  It needs to indicate that the aircraft flightpaths, as known at the time the 
distribution is measured, will lead to the aircraft being in close proximity.  It is a 
measure of hazard potential.  Note that this measurement takes no account of the 
action of the remaining system layers.  The choice of a scale for Dc is essentially 
arbitrary: Figure 3 shows a choice in which the full line curve is unbounded (eg for 
high values of Dc could correspond to the inverse of the projected closest point of 
approach (CPA) distance).   
 
Degree of 
conflict Dc 
– measured 
at a transit 
point 
Number of conflicts 
A 
5.1
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If the statistical distribution is rescaled by using something like a logarithmic 
transformation of the number of flights – so as to compress the horizontal scale 
(indicated by the zigzag on the horizontal axis) – then the action of the layers looks 
like Figure 4.   
 
 
Figure 4. System layers changing the shape of the Conflict Distribution 
Each of the Layers acts to reduce the frequency of the high conflict events – they 
transform the conflict pattern from the initial I to the final IV.  A beneficial change 
then increases the rate of descent at the left and pushes the intercept on the Dc = 0 
axis to the right.    
 
How do the system layers work?  The language of System Theory as applied to 
safety distinguishes between tightly versus loosely coupled systems (Weick, 1976; 
Perrow, 1984):  
The sub-components of a tightly coupled system have immediate impacts on 
each other.  Tightly coupled systems can survive failures, if that failure has 
been anticipated and provided for in the original design.  Thus, tightly coupled 
systems must therefore be designed to anticipate all the failure modes and 
providing safety features for continued operation and recovery.  These kinds 
of designs can usually be modelled quantitatively, and their performance can 
be validated against what happens in the real world, eg by studying the kinds 
of accidents, incidents, failures and errors that occur.   
Loosely coupled systems have flexibility in the timing, nature or intensity of 
responses.  They accommodate failures through adaptive responses.  There 
is some ‘play’ in the (negative) feedback loops—a little over-correction, then 
some under correction.  Such systems are adaptable and error tolerant, but 
can have long reaction times.  Loosely coupled designs use much more 
complex information sources – eg through human visualization and situational 
awareness, so they tend to be open and continually interacting with the 
outside environment.   
Planning Operation Alert 
I II III IV 
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In summary, in safety terms, loosely coupled systems can accommodate 
shocks, failures, and pressures for change without destabilization, while tightly 
coupled systems respond more rapidly to perturbations – but the response 
can be disastrous.  
 
The ATM system layers have elements of both types of coupling.  The Planning and 
Alert Layers tend to be more tightly coupled, because their action should be 
‘programmed’.  The Operation Layer tends to be more loosely coupled, because 
pilots and controllers make strategic and tactical decisions.  Their decision-making 
does however reflect their training, so they will tend to do similar things in similar 
situations and (eg) highly skilled pilots will make fewer strategic/decision errors 
(Wiegmann and Shappell, 2001).   
 
However, each layer acts to transforms the distribution in a probabilistic fashion, 
rather than a deterministic one in which specific events necessarily follow particular 
causes.  A particular aircraft configuration or routeing should be changed by the 
layers into a different one, which probably has a lower degree of conflict.  But, on 
some occasions, the pilot or controller will choose to do something that does not 
improve the Dc value.  A collision can occur if the system is in the hazardous state 
and the remaining system layers do not correct this.  Thus, on a small proportion of 
cases, eg when an aircraft has just manoeuvred considerably and the aircraft pair is 
suddenly very close, ACAS might recommend an inappropriate course of action. 
 
Note the difference between this kind of system metaphor and other kinds of system 
perspectives, such as those of Bird (1974), Rasmussen (1990) and Reason (1990).  
The approach here is foreshadowed in Rasmussen: “The causal tree found by an 
accident analysis is only a record of one past case, not a model of the involved 
relational structure…We should be fighting types, not individual tokens…”  In 
Reason’s descriptive models of system safety defences, the probabilistic aspects are 
modelled by the number and size of holes in defensive layers (eg Shappell and 
Wiegmann, 2001).  The metaphor used here has the advantage that it shows clearly 
how the degree of conflict can reduce and increase during the sequence of an 
aircraft’s transit through the ATM system.  Human error, in the widest sense, remains 
a major element in this causal chain, as it does for aviation in general (Courteney 
and Newman, 2003). 
 
Philosophical models of ‘Probabilistic Causation’ have a long history, eg Sosa and 
Tooley (1993).  Examples of relevant aviation-related work are by Ladkin (2000), 
which provides a different ‘logic-orientated’ perspective, and by Greenwell et al 
(2003).  There is a huge, multidisciplinary literature on this topic. 
 
ATM layered concepts are the subject of research current interest.  A very thought-
provoking paper is by Graham et al (2003), which inter alia proposes the uses of a 
loop picture to explain the nature of information flow and decision-making between 
ATM layers.  Graham et al trace back the idea of a layered approach to Villiers 
(1968).  Interestingly, the French title of Villiers’ paper uses the phrase “la méthode 
des filtres”, thus giving filtering as a useful metaphor. 
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Figure 5. Examples of transition paths 
Figure 5 shows a ‘cut-down’ version of Figure 4 with some examples of conflict level 
transformations: 
a [full line] A comparatively high conflict level is reduced markedly by the 
planning Layers.  The conflict level then hardly changes: the Operation 
Layers do not increase the Dc, the Alert Layers are not required, and so the 
end result is a low conflict level. 
b [dashed line] This path shows a very high conflict level reduced to a 
moderate conflict level by the Planning Layers.  Then some kind of 
Operation problem increases the Dc, sufficient the Alert Layer to come into 
action and reduce the conflict markedly. 
c – [dotted line] In this transition path the low Dc at the initial stage is reduced 
even further by the Planning Layers.  But the Operation Layers then 
increase the conflict level considerably.  The Alert Layers turn out to be 
ineffective, so the Dc is very high. 
The key point is that the Dc value can rise and fall through the sequence of system 
layers.  There are obviously many different possibilities, eg these transition paths do 
not show a case in which the Planning Layers increase the risk.  These could be 
very significant, given that the route and airspace structure is probably more likely to 
increase the number of aircraft on conflicting paths.  This also serves to highlights an 
example of interaction between the layers.  The main purpose of route structures for 
ATM could be considered to be helping controllers to identify conflicts (ie by forcing 
crossing points at particular locations etc), and hence improving the effectiveness of 
the Operational layer. 
 
It is one thing describing such a probabilistic process as a metaphor, but this needs 
to be turned into something that is quantitative.  For present purposes, all that is 
required is a simple categorisation of ‘errors’ made by the system layers.  These are 
of two types so, using analogous language to statistical hypothesis testing: 
Type 1 error – failing to reduce the Dc when it is high (α) 
Type 2 error – increasing the Dc when it is low (β) 
Planning Operation Alert 
a 
b 
c 
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Next, it is necessary to categorise the Dc distributions in two bands: hazard potential 
and safe:  
The ‘hazard potential’ band comprises flights for which there is a high degree 
of risk.   
Aircraft in the ‘safe’ band are not in any risk now – but could be if the further 
safety layers did not act appropriately.   
The proportions of hazard potential and safe flights are h and s, with their sum 
adding to unity.  (Obviously, a much more complex banding is possible, with h1, h2, 
h3…representing a finer-structured grouping, but for present purposes the two bands 
are sufficient.)  Thus, probabilities α and β are respectively the proportion of 
situations with hazard potential that remain in this state and the proportion of safe 
instances that move to having hazard potential.   
 
As an aside, it is possible to view the system layer process as a Markov Chain (eg 
Cox and Miller, 1977) or as a Bayesian network (eg Neil et al, 2003).  These offer 
new ways of thinking – in rational and quantitative terms – about ATM safety and the 
actions of the system layers.  This kind of analytical approach (compare Wiegmann 
and Shappell, 2003) may be more productive for modelling than (eg) Reason’s 
descriptive ideas.   
4. AIRPROXES, HAZARDS AND SYSTEM LAYERS 
The material of the previous two sections can now be used to analyse Airproxes.  .  
Airproxes are chosen here because they are publicly available and well documented 
– Airprox statistics are often publicised as a ‘gold standard’ of UK ATM safety.  It 
must be stressed that other safety incident data – eg the CAA’s MORS data, and 
NATS SMF data and other databases would no doubt be at least equally valid ATM 
safety incident sources. 
 
Airprox Category Description 
CAT A - Risk of Collision:  
 
The risk classification of an aircraft proximity in 
which serious risk of collision has existed. 
CAT B - Safety Not Assured:  The risk classification of an aircraft proximity in 
which the safety of the aircraft may have been 
compromised. 
CAT C - No risk of Collision:  
 
The risk classification of an aircraft proximity in 
which no risk of collision has existed. 
Risk Not determined:  
 
The risk classification of an aircraft proximity in 
which insufficient information was available to 
determine the risk involved or inconclusive or 
conflicting evidence precluded such 
determination. 
Figure 6. ICAO Doc 4444 AIRPROX Severity Scheme (eg Eurocontrol, 2002) 
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Figure 6 shows the internal (ICAO) definitions for Airprox categories (eg Eurocontrol 
SRC, 2002).  Note the use of the word ‘existed’, ie at some point there was a 
perception/judgement of hazard.  Next, Figure 7 illustrates a generic Airprox. 
 
 
Figure 7. Sequence for a possible Airprox – see text for explanation 
Figure 7 illustrates the time sequence for a possible Airprox – the black aircraft might 
collide with the grey one: three ‘snapshots’ in time are shown.  A problem of some 
kind is the precursor of a possible Airprox – it could be a miscommunication and a 
failure to note a relevant piece of information.  This problem could lead to a mid-air 
collision within a few minutes if nothing further is done.  At some point, this problem 
begins, but this is probably not immediately detected by the aircrew or ATC.  Later, 
potential consequences of the problem are detected: this could be at any point from 
the initiation of the problem to an automatic alert to the pilot/controller.  Action then 
takes place.  This action might be a new instruction to the pilot, a manoeuvre by the 
pilot, or just close monitoring by ATC (if the aircrafts’ projected flightpaths do not in 
fact lead to close proximity, then new instructions would not be necessary – or even 
desirable).  Finally, the two aircraft reach their CPA.  This whole process is an 
Airprox. 
 
Note that the reporting of such an occurrence as a potential Airprox need not be a 
statement by the reportee that the situation was ‘hazardous’.  It need only be a view 
by the reportee that ‘this kind of aircraft configuration should not have occurred if the 
rules are followed properly’.  To be hazardous in the terms used here, the 
occurrence must satisfy: 
On the information available and without further action/intervention, the 
flightpaths, allowing for typical variabilities, would produce a close proximity 
between the aircraft; and 
In these circumstances, the remaining system layers would not prevent the 
dangerous CPA. 
Time 
problem 
begins 
problem 
detected 
Closest point 
of approach
Action 
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Expressed in a different way: 
A hazardous event is one in which there is a high degree of conflict plus a low 
confidence that the remaining system layers would generally provide the 
necessary corrective action. 
One test is to judge the probability that the remaining system layers would deal with 
the conflict in a straightforward fashion, in other words estimate the effects of the 
remaining α and β parameters.  What is the probability that the remaining system 
layers will fail to resolve this high degree of conflict?  Turning the question around, if 
it had not been detected, is it highly probable that the system layers would have 
converted to ‘safe’?  The expert judgement/estimate that has to be made about an 
ATM incident (such as an Airprox) is of the chance that the remaining system layers 
will not resolve the situation safely.  This assessment might be made using 
something like the ARIBA (1999b) approach (which attempted to build an accident 
risk tolerability/acceptability matrix for air traffic operations on HSE (UK Health and 
Safety Executive, 1992 and 1999) lines).   
5. DISCUSSION 
This discussion section consists of seven largely independent sub-sections, mainly 
exploring some of the questions raised in the Introduction.   
5.1 Real-Life Analyses 
5.2 Which incidents should be judged the most important to ATM system 
safety? 
5.3 Are ‘minor’ incidents of any importance? 
5.4 The Value of the System Layer Concept 
5.5 Examples of Airproxes 
5.6 The Right Lessons from Mid-air Collisions? 
5.7 NATS Safety Significant Events 
5.1 Real-Life Analyses 
What are really the questions about ATM incidents that need to be answered by 
safety managers and regulators?  What kinds of action should they take?  How can 
these people demonstrate that they have done their job properly?  Certainly, one 
way of knowing what one should do is to contemplate the consequences of not doing 
certain things.  This implies that they must act reasonably and rationally – but they 
must be active rather than passive (ie ATM incidents must be analysed from the 
viewpoint of ‘looking for trouble’).   
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However, the public’s and air traveller’s concerns must surely be focused on the 
safety levels achieved in the real world, rather than on speculations.  Why should 
they care about ‘what might have been in some theoretical alternative universe’ – 
composed of ‘what ifs’ – in which things had been ‘slightly different’?  So is it valid or 
sensible to examine these ‘what ifs’?  
 
The answer is that it is necessary for ATM incident analysts to think in this kind of 
way.  This is not some nugatory or over-sophisticated ‘icing on the cake’.  The mark 
of the genuine safety expert is to be able to ask the right questions about incidents 
concerning potential accidents.  The messages from an incident do not simply 
‘announce themselves’ to the analyst: they provide the raw material for his or her 
productive thoughts about system safety.   
 
When aviation systems fail, they often do so fail in apparently complex and 
unpredictable ways (Amalberti, 2000; Wickens, 2003): the aviation expert is 
someone who perceives the fundamental causal and system factors.  Such people 
are rare individuals – the kind of structured thinking outlined here is intended to 
supplement their expertise.   
 
[If an expert had been able to predict the failure mode of the Comet aircraft – that 
metal fatigue concentrated at the corners of the aircraft's windows would probably 
cause catastrophic crashes (three in 1953) – then the UK’s commercial aviation 
industry would have followed a very different path.  One aspect of the tragedy that is 
relevant here was the absence of an earlier related minor incident that could have 
warned the designers of this kind of failure mode.  How much worse would a 
catastrophe be viewed by relatives and the public if it could have reasonably been 
prevented by learning from an earlier incident’s characteristics?] 
 
One way of recognising the need to examine ‘what ifs’, is to envisage an ATM 
system covering a large area.  For simplicity, assume a constant amount of traffic 
every year, that the underlying ‘safety culture’ and regulatory framework is 
unchanging.  The nature of ATM incidents in such a scenario will vary in an infinite 
number of ways: there will be changes in aircraft types and their flight departure 
times, runway usage, meteorological conditions, choices made by controllers, etc, 
will lead to different kinds of incidents occurring at different times from year to year.  
However, the ‘pattern’ of these incidents – the causal nature of these incidents and 
the action of the system layers – will be much the same from year to year; the 
observed Dc values are effectively a ‘sample’ from this much larger population of 
potentially feasible conflict patterns.   
 
The expert is the person who can comprehend the underlying patterns revealed by 
incidents.  He or she can then rationally extrapolate those observed over many years 
to identify the most probable accident in a coming year. 
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5.2 Which incidents should be judged the most important to ATM system 
safety?   
The most important incidents to ATM system safety are surely those in which only 
the Alert layer prevents a collision, because these represent failures of the previous 
system layers.  Was the incident reported subsequent to an Alert?  If so, the 
protection against mid-collision could have depended on the chance relation 
between the aircraft trajectories relied – the lack of such an event could have been 
wholly fortuitous.  The analyst could therefore ask: “If one of the aircraft departure 
times had been (say) up to 30 seconds different, would there have been a collision?” 
 
There has been important work on the performance of the Alert layer (ie which relate 
to its α and β parameters).  As part of ICAO panel studies, Harrison (1993), reported 
calculations and simulation results that: 
For every 100 critical Airproxes and under a variety of assumptions about 
traffic awareness and pilot responses (eg neglecting the use that a pilot might 
make of TA information prior to an RA – a very cautious assumption): 
94 will be resolved safely 
6 will not be resolved 
4 new Airproxes will be induced because non-critical encounters are 
converted into critical ones 
McLaughlin (1999) has produced some current estimates on the benefits of ACAS. 
Hale and Law (1989) provides an examination Simultaneous Operation of Conflict 
Alert and ACAS II in UK En-Route Airspace.   
5.3 Are ‘minor’ incidents of any importance? 
ATM incidents do not need to be deemed hazardous to be informative or to generate 
action.  The decision-maker needs to have in mind something like the HSE’s ALARP 
philosophy (Appendix B; HSE, 1992/1999).  Given that the system is very safe, 
specific safety management measures – changes to procedures, equipment, 
software – should be implemented as long as such is reasonably practicable.  This 
generally implies some kind of analysis of costs and benefits.  To give an example 
(edited text from NATS, 2004): 
“In November 2002, an Airprox involving a Virgin 747 and a Delta 767, in 
which track data blocks for the two aircraft were inadvertently swapped on-
screen, which was subsequently assessed by the UKAB as category C (no 
risk of collision).  Immediately after this particular incident, an instruction was 
issued to controllers reminding them of the correct procedure to follow when 
individual track data blocks are re-positioned, in order to prevent a repeat of 
these events.  In 2004, NATS changed its software, further improving the 
legibility of track data blocks.  The change ensures that, whenever a data 
block is moved, it will be automatically linked (by way of a strut on the screen) 
to the aircraft target to which it belongs.” 
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Thus, key questions are: “Is there evidence of a systematic design flaw?  Can it be 
corrected without disproportionate cost?  Are international agreements an issue?” 
5.4 The Value of the System Layer Concept 
The safety of the system is the product of the effectiveness of the system layers.  
The questions are obvious ones.  Did they operate as they were planned?  Did a 
failure in the earlier system layers produce an aircraft pair configuration and/or 
circumstances that might not generally be corrected by the remaining layers? 
 
If the incident is a consequence of a known category of system layer failure, is the 
frequency of this type of failure (= the α value) increasing over time?  If so, what is 
being done to reduce the rate by ‘tweaking’ the system layers to improve their 
capture of such failures?  Actions/decisions include such things as additional training 
for pilots or controllers, patches to airspace designs, tailoring of STCA/ACAS, etc. 
 
It is not sufficient to focus on the extent to which separation minima are breached, or 
the nature of actions by the pilot/controller.  These are vital issues, but they must be 
seen in the context of the system control provided by the system layers.  A low CPA 
may represent little hazard if, in those particular circumstances, both pilots could see 
the other aircraft visually and on their ACAS displays.  A larger CPA for an event not 
detected by either pilots or controller, and subject to a very late ACAS alert because 
of manoeuvring aircraft, is a much more serious matter in system safety terms.  The 
pilot/controller may have taken no action because there was insufficient time for it to 
be effective of because they judged that it might make a bad situation even worse.  
An STCA alert and/or a pilot/controller action represent the system controls – the 
system layers – functioning effectively, rather than a necessarily hazardous situation. 
 
It almost goes without saying that monitoring the frequency of failures – the α and β 
parameters – is vitally important.  For example, the ATM provider might monitor 
‘Safety Separation Breaches’, composed of incidents in which separation was 
significantly breached (rather than a minor infringement by a fraction of a nm) or in 
which the controller had to act on a STCA alert (Brooker, 2004).   
 
Another way in which this kind of model is useful is to consider how the different 
layers vary in different types of ATM operation.  For instance, in Oceanic operations 
the operational layer is comparatively weak compared with radar control, but the 
planning layer is generally very effective in reducing the degree of conflict – but see 
the next sub-section.   
5.5 Examples of Airproxes 
It is worth examining half a dozen examples of Airproxes to back up the arguments 
of the preceding text.  None of these incidents was rated as deserving the (highest) 
Airprox category A.  But to what extent do they provide important lessons about 
potential accidents?  Some of these particular incidents were chosen because the 
UKAB text used or implied the word ‘fortuitous’.  The following text – Figure 8 – is of 
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course heavily summarised from the original material [NB: 127/99 is incident number 
127 in 1999, etc and the aircraft are A and B]: 
 
Airprox 127/99 Recorded Separation was 1100 ft 
Context & Issues Warnings 1.7.1.1.1.1 Event, Monitoring & Intervention 
Extremely busy 
period, issues 
about display of 
data blocks 
Outside STCA 
parameters.  
ACAS RAs to both 
aircraft 
Controller had issued a descent clearance that would 
have led aircraft A to descend through the level of 
aircraft B, which he had inadvertently not taken into 
account. 
 
 
Airprox 29/00 Recorded Separation at CPA was 0.6 NM and 600 ft. 
Context & Issues Warnings Event, Monitoring & Intervention 
Flight deck 
procedure error, 
fatigue 
ACAS RA both to 
A and B. 
STCA activated 
before ACAS 
passed to ATC 
Aircraft descended below its cleared level.  Neither pilot 
saw the other aircraft.  ATC occupied with other traffic, 
did not spot high descent rate.  Board agreed that any 
separation was to a large degree fortuitous…with 
different geometry …could have been considerably 
more serious. 
 
Airprox 54/00 Recorded Separation at CPA was 12 NM 
Context & Issues Warnings Event, Monitoring & Intervention 
In oceanic 
airspace, period of 
data processing 
(FDPS) manual 
reversion 
No warnings Neither pilot saw the other aircraft.  …the SCACC 
Domestic Controller…detect[ed] the conflict from a 
routine scanning of her radar display.…an ATCO 
member said that, in his opinion, separation in this case 
was fortuitous.  had the encounter taken place further 
west, outside the cover of domestic radar, the 
confliction would have remained undetected and the 
outcome might have been more serious… 
 
Airprox 145/00 Recorded Separation was 0 45 NM and 400 ft 
Context & Issues Warnings Event, Monitoring & Intervention 
Previous military 
fighter formation, 
severe weather, 
ATC preoccupied 
with other conflict, 
workload  
ACAS RA to A 
only.  ATC at 
airport not STCA 
equipped.  LATCC 
STCA alert 
ATC did not maintain standard separation between 
aircraft A and B.  Pilot A, because of weather, saw B 
only after the ACAS alert.  Pilot B heard the ACAS alert 
on RT and saw A subsequently.  ATC was not aware of 
conflict until advised of ACAS alert. 
 
Airprox 164/03 Recorded Separation was 3.7 NM and 500 ft 
Context & Issues Warnings 1.7.1.1.1.2 Event, Monitoring & Intervention 
No apparent ATC 
causal factors, 
non-standard 
phraseology 
STCA alerted 
after the aircraft 
had received an 
ACAS RA.   
Aircraft A crew descended below their cleared level into 
conflict with aircraft B.   
 
Airprox 184/03 Recorded Separation was 3.4 NM and 600 ft 
Context & Issues Warnings 1.7.1.1.1.3 Event, Monitoring & Intervention 
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Controller with an 
inexperienced 
trainee, combined 
sector – ‘busy’ but 
within 
capabilities’.   
STCA activated 
and shortly 
afterwards an 
ACAS RA climb 
was issued.   
The aircraft B crew read back the wrong heading and 
level instructions, which went undetected by the 
controller.  The controller said he had no reason to 
doubt that the aircraft would not comply with the issued 
clearance.   
Figure 8. Edited text from Airprox Reports 
Each of these incidents exhibits the potential for a more serious incident or even an 
accident.  Most of them show the ATM system getting into an operational state in 
which recovery was not assured by subsequent system defensive processes, or 
where the failure/error occurred at such a late stage that the remaining safety 
defensive layers had a large element of chance.  Each of them should therefore be 
marked as having more safety significance than incidents in which (say) STCA gave 
a very early warning and the controller was able to resolve the problem before any 
kind of ACAS warning was given. 
 
Several of the incidents show well-known Human Factors aspects.  Airprox 127/99 is 
an example of a failure of prospective memory (eg Loft et al, 2003).  Airprox 29/00 is 
an example of an aircrew procedure error with fatigue as a factor.  Airprox 145/00 is 
a loss of the necessary situation awareness (eg Endsley et al, 2003), given a 
complex set of circumstances.  Communications procedures are well known to be a 
source of potential problems, eg Airprox 184/03. 
 
The oceanic incident, Airprox 54/00 is perhaps an example of a (currently?) inherent 
ATM system design limitation.  The North Atlantic region ATM system does not have 
radar coverage, hence it does not have STCA available.  The necessary safety is 
delivered by the use of large, essentially procedural separation minima, Mach 
Number flying techniques, and positional reports every 10 degrees of longitude.  
ACAS is a critical safety defensive layer.   
 
Some defensive system layers do not function for certain types of manoeuvre.  If the 
aircrew or the controller mistakenly climb or descend an aircraft, then a potential 
conflict may not be picked up in time for STCA to alert, so the hazard is reduced by a 
combination of ACAS and the pilot’s see-and-avoid, eg Airproxes 164/2003 and 
127/99.   
 
Equipment failures and mal-functions are comparatively rare these days compared 
with Human Factors issues (in the broadest sense).  Airprox 54/00 notes a case of 
FDPS manual reversion, which could affect considerably the oceanic safety layers.  
Airprox 222/02, referred to in the previous sub-section, arose because of a confusing 
display of overlapping track data blocks and aircraft symbols.  This led the controller 
to confuse the relative positions of the two aircraft so that one was descended into 
conflict with the other.   
A caveat needs to be entered about the degree to which the safety system layers 
can be fully understood  solely from this kind of incident data.  In particular, incidents 
rarely give much insight into the working of the Planning layer.  The Planning layer is 
not designed to eliminate all conflicts (except, as already noted, in procedural control 
in oceanic systems), so the fact that aircraft may be in conflict is not an incident until 
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the Operational layer fails to detect and resolve the conflict.  This implies the need to 
collect other precursor information.  How many conflicts of different types are being 
solved routinely by the existing safety system?   
5.6 The Right Lessons from Mid-air Collisions? 
European mid-air collisions in controlled airspace are rare.  Their characteristics can 
be analysed in exactly the same way to incidents.  On 1 July 2002, two ACAS-
equipped aircraft collided over the Swiss-German border at Überlingen.  One 
important feature of the accident was that the flight crew of one aircraft did not follow 
the ACAS alert, but followed instead the ATC instruction.  Guidance material now 
stresses that pilots should follow alerts and that controllers should not attempt to 
modify the flight path of an aircraft responding to an alert.   
 
The full official report on this tragedy has recently been published (BFU, 2004).  
There have already been attempts to analyse the causal factors involved, eg Nunes 
and Laursen (2004) identify six ‘contributing factors’: Single Man Operations, 
Downgraded Radar [STCA], Dual Frequency Responsibility, Phone System, ACAS, 
Corporate Culture.   
 
 
Figure 9. Components of ATM System safety 
One clear message from Überlingen is that it is not only the providers who must take 
responsibility for preventing accidents.  In Figure 9, ATC is air traffic control, CNS is 
the communications, navigation and surveillance systems, DP is all the data 
processing and information flows.  These can be termed system ‘Guardians’, as 
distinct from the various service providers.  The Government sets up the regulatory 
regime; the airspace policy has to recognise the needs to accommodate all users: 
commercial flights, military flights and general aviation.  The safety regulator has to 
be confident that everything works safely: “To require enterprises to take proper 
account of the hazards to which they expose people”.  The regulator cannot always 
believe what it is told by or reads in documents by the service provider.  The 
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regulator’s job does not end there, for example, it must ensure that the system 
delivers the right kinds of safety-related training.   
 
This multiplicity of factors indicates the unusual nature of the Überlingen accident.  A 
picture of the mid-air collision on the lines of Figure 5 would show a very high conflict 
level at every point in the diagram, with the final failure to act correctly on the ACAS 
warning raising the conflict level to the actual collision event.  But if the accident had 
not occurred – if the aircraft had, by providence, missed by several hundred feet – 
would the same kinds of international actions have been taken by regulators and 
providers?  These questions just make an even stronger case for international 
learning from the collection and thorough analysis of incidents.  This learning has to 
identify those incidents that reveal inherent system control flaws or regulatory 
gaps/inconsistencies and offer ways of dealing with them.   
5.7 NATS Safety Significant Events 
Airprox classifications represent an example of what might be termed a ‘Board of 
Inquiry’ perspective, exemplified in UK aviation by the work of the AAIB (2004), 
which examines accidents and incidents.  The AAIB’s remit is stated as:  
“The fundamental purpose of investigating accidents is to determine the 
circumstances and causes of the accident…It is not to apportion blame or 
liability” 
This appears straightforward – but the hidden text is: 
“with a view to the preservation of life and the avoidance of accidents in the 
future”, 
which actually coincides with a central message here about asking rational and 
professional ‘what if’ questions. 
 
Safety managers and analysts working for ATC providers do attempt this kind of 
thing.  An example is NATS’ work on the Safety Significant Event (SSE) scheme, 
which has been under development since the mid-1990s [NB: the author participated 
in the early work].  Eurocontrol has recently given support to this kind of approach for 
categorising incidents (eg Eurocontrol, 2004).   
 
SSEs in a radar control environment are defined relative to bands:  
Band 1: Separation ≤ 66% of the prescribed separation.   
Band 2: Separation > 66% of the prescribed separation.   
SSEP: A Band 2 incident, which involved aircraft losing separation or potentially losing 
separation with another aircraft where there was a possible ATC error.   
SSE4: A Band 1 incident which was detected and resolved in the most effective and timely 
manner by the controller who was providing the service when the incident occurred, and no 
systems failures or procedures affected the resolution.   
SSE3: A Band 1 event which was detected and resolved by ATC but:  
o it was not resolved by the controller who was providing the service when the event 
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was initiated; or  
o it was detected by colleague warning, STCA or pilot query; or  
o it was not resolved in either a timely manner; or  
o it was not resolved in an effective manner; or 
o systems or procedures failures affected the resolution. 
SSE2: A Band 1 event, which was resolved by the pilot/other. 
SSE1: A Band 1 event for which no timely/effective pilot/other action was taken to resolve the 
event (providence) or there was a high risk that the action taken would not have been 
successful. 
Figure 10. SSE classification re ‘Loss of separation in a radar control environment’ 
Figure 10 shows how incident data on breaches of separation is classified according 
to the SSE scheme.  The similarity to the kinds of ideas explored here is in the use of 
words such as ‘providence’ and ‘action taken would not have been successful’. 
 
Recent discussions by the author with NATS experts suggest that the SSE scheme 
has been judged very successful in safety management terms, in particular that it 
has helped the organisation to focus on key safety issues.  Unfortunately, there has 
been little published by NATS in the safety literature on how the scheme is used.  
Searches on the web and on academic electronic databases (in particular the British 
Library's Electronic Table of Contents ‘zetoc’) reveal very few open-literature 
technical documents about the use of SSEs.  One that is very much worth 
mentioning is the work by Neil et al (2003), which addresses the same kind of 
problem as that examined here.   
6. CONCLUSIONS 
The aim is to try to ensure that analysis and expert judgement about ATM incidents 
can be carried out within a systematic and consistent safety framework.  Hazards 
and risks are not ‘facts’ or ‘events’ that ‘exist’, but rather judgements made about 
conditional futures and their consequences.  This judgement (or perception or 
opinion) is about the degree of possibility of some unpleasant state of things that 
may come into existence at some future time.  A hazardous situation is not one in 
which aircraft happened to be close, but rather one in which the outcome was not 
‘system controlled’, with some potential outcomes having significant negative 
consequences.  System controls in this sense cover all the means by which the 
system is held stable (= defended) against the potential negative consequences. 
 
The ATM system can be (over-) simplified to consist of three structural system layers 
acting as the system controls: Planning (pre-operational), Operation (the flight in 
progress), and Alert (the ground and air protection enabled by STCA and ACAS, on 
which the controller/pilot will act).  Each Layer acts to reduce the frequency of high 
conflict events in a probabilistic fashion.  ATM safety improvements correspond to 
monitoring and acting upon two probabilities α and β for each system layer: these 
are respectively the proportion of hazardous situations that remain hazardous and 
the proportion of safe instances that become hazardous.   
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A hazardous event is one in which a high degree of conflict between aircraft is 
observed plus a low confidence that the remaining system layers would generally 
provide the necessary corrective action.  The expert judgement/estimate that has to 
be made about the hazardousness of an ATM incident (such as an Airprox) is of the 
likelihood that the remaining system layers will not resolve the situation safely.   
 
It is necessary for ATM incident analysts to think in this kind of way – and indeed for 
their managers to ensure that they have enough time to think.  It is not enough just 
for the analysts to be intelligent, knowledgeable and energetic.  Just ‘keeping to the 
facts’ could fail to anticipate the future.  The mark of the genuine safety expert is to 
be able to ask the right questions concerning potential accidents – to show 
imagination and system insight.  The messages from an incident do not simply 
‘announce themselves’ to the analyst.  However, they do provide the raw material for 
productive thoughts and wise judgements about system safety.  Thus, ATM safety 
analysts need first to get data to determine the general effectiveness of the different 
safety layers, and then to be able to determine the differences in layer performance 
for different varieties of event. 
 
Returning to the kinds of specific safety questions that can be asked about ATM 
incidents, some answers can be attempted: 
 
Which incidents should be judged the most important to ATM system safety?  
The most important ones are those in which only the final stages of the Alert 
layer prevented a collision, because this represents a failure of the previous 
system layers.  The protection against mid-collision could have depended on 
the chance – fortuitous – relation between the aircraft trajectories relied.  “If 
one of the aircraft departure times had been (say) up to 30 seconds different, 
would there have been a collision?”  Would there have been enough time to 
analyse, decide and act successfully?   
 
Which incidents give most guidance about potential accidents?  The crucial 
incidents are those in which the system got into a state in which recovery was 
not assured by subsequent system defensive processes, or where the 
failure/error occurred at such a late stage that the remaining safety defensive 
layers had a large element of chance.  Was an accident prevented by design 
or by chance?  Were, for example, the system defensive layers there (but did 
not function to specification), weakened (through other elements in the system 
environment), or absent (perhaps because of regulatory flaws/gaps)? 
 
In what ways should incidents be categorised and analysed to help pinpoint 
key safety issues?  Additional categorisation schemes probably do not add 
much to safety improvement!  Describing, in ever greater detail, the symptoms 
of a patient’s illness is much less important than finding a cure for that illness.  
The important thing is to highlight flaws in system controllability by using 
something like the transition path picture; and to identify from this what might 
be possible solutions (or to recognise openly the inherent limits of present 
ATM system design, technology and operation). 
 
 24
Are ‘minor’ incidents of any safety importance?  Yes.  Incidents that are minor, 
in terms of the ‘Board of Inquiry view’ of the actual event, can be very 
informative or even generate decisive action.  Is there evidence of a 
systematic design flaw?  Can this flaw be corrected without disproportionate 
cost?  Are international agreements an issue?  Does the incident reveal 
readily correctable flaws in regulatory instructions or training? 
 
How should the relevant importance of different incidents be assessed or 
weighted to provide a true picture of the health of the ATM safety system?  
The vital need is international learning from incident reports.  ATM systems in 
developed countries use much the same equipment and operating concepts, 
so that ‘ATM health’ is (at least) that of the European system.  This learning 
has to identify those incidents that reveal inherent system control flaws or 
regulatory gaps/inconsistencies – and offer ways of dealing with them.  This 
safety evolution has to be an international process, not a national one.  Safety 
experts must use all the information they can get to improve the ATM system, 
which strongly supports the need for international openness about safety data 
and its analysis. 
 
The key safety management question, for both Providers and Guardians, to bear in 
mind is: “If Überlingen had been a severe incident not an accident, would the same 
safety lessons have been learned or pursued so vigorously?  Would it have been put 
to one side as a ‘unique event’?”   
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APPENDIX A 
 
 
WORD DEFINITIONS RELEVANT TO HAZARDOUS EVENTS 
 
Figure A1 sets out a group of word definitions relevant to hazardous events.  These 
are extracted from a well-established dictionary (Chambers, 2001); the deleted text 
is irrelevant material (eg that a metal box used to store valuables is a ‘safe’).  [The 
words selected here also include some relating to factual evidence – ‘actual’ and 
‘existing’, which will be used later here.]   
 
Word Definition – Relevant Extracts 
chance noun  1 the way that things happen unplanned and unforeseen.  
2 fate or luck; fortune.  3 an unforeseen and unexpected 
occurrence… 
danger noun 1 a situation or state in which someone or something may 
suffer harm, an injury or a loss… 2 something that may 
cause harm, injury or loss.  3 a possibility of something 
unpleasant happening.  [from French dangier power, 
therefore 'power to harm'] 
dangerous adjective likely or able to cause harm or injury 
hazard noun 1 a risk of harm or danger.  2 something which is likely to 
cause harm or danger… 4 chance; accident 
hazardous adjective 1 very risky; dangerous.  2 depending on chance; 
uncertain 
risk noun 1 the chance or possibility of suffering loss, injury, 
damage, etc; danger.  2 someone or something likely to 
cause loss, injury, damage, etc… 
safe adjective 
 
1 free from danger or harm.  2 unharmed.  3 giving 
protection from danger or harm; secure… 4 not dangerous 
or harmful… 5 involving no risk of loss; assured… 7 
cautious 
safety noun 1 the quality or condition of being safe… 
  
actual adjective 
 
1 existing as fact; real.  2 not imagined, estimated or 
guessed.  3 current; present.  [from French actuel, 
meaning 'demonstrated by one's actions'] 
exist verb (existed, 
existing) 
1 to be, especially to be present in the real world or 
universe rather than in story or imagination.  2 to occur or 
be found… 
straightforward 
adjective 
1 without difficulties or complications; simple… 
 
Figure A1. Dictionary Definitions of Hazard-related terms (Chambers (2001) 
 
 29
APPENDIX B 
 
 
HSE RISK ASSESSMENT 
 
The Health and Safety Executive (HSE, 1992, 1999) version of risk assessment is 
illustrated in Figure B1 
 
 
Risk reduction 
Regardless of cost 
 
Relevant Good Practice 
Plus 
Risk reduction 
Measures 
Plus 
Gross 
Disproportion 
 
 
Relevant Good 
Practice 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure B1.  ALARP Approach (taken from HSE) 
 
 
Risk is classified by the HSE as being in one of three categories: intolerable, 
tolerable if ALARP, and broadly acceptable (‘negligible’ in some variants) (Figure 
B1).  Note that the boundary lines between the risk categories negligible, tolerable, 
and intolerable need to be specified; they are not automatically set.   
 
A checklist of (simplified) HSE definitions is: 
ALARP principle The principle that no risk in the tolerability region can be 
accepted unless reduced ‘As Low As Reasonably Practicable’. 
broadly acceptable risk A risk which is generally acceptable without further 
reduction.   
intolerable risk A risk which cannot be accepted and must be reduced.   
tolerability region A region of risk which is neither high enough to be 
Intolerable 
Tolerable if ALARP 
Broadly Acceptable 
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unacceptable nor low enough to be broadly acceptable.  Risks in this region 
must be reduced ALARP.   
 
The decision processes are: 
• If a system’s risk falls into the intolerable category, then action must be 
taken to redress this.  If this is not possible, the system should be halted or 
not implemented.   
• If a system’s risk falls into the tolerable category, it must be proven that it 
is low as reasonably practicable within that region for the system to be 
considered acceptable.  Thus, showing a system is ALARP means 
demonstrating that any further risk reduction in the tolerable zone is either 
impracticable or ‘grossly disproportionate’ (ie it can be shown that the cost 
of the measure is far in excess of any benefit to be gained).   
• If a system’s risk falls into the negligible category, no action is required 
other than monitoring to ensure that the negligible risk is maintained.   
 
An examination of ‘what people actually do in aviation’ suggests that the message is 
that the regulators nearly always operate in the ‘tolerable if ALARP’ region – it 
cannot be ‘intolerable’ because flights would therefore have to stop or being tightly 
constrained.  It cannot be broadly acceptable because there are always incidents 
and accidents that the public expects regulators to examine to see if things can be 
tightened up.  In the middle region, the regulators usually deal with 
procedural/organizational changes, which are often of low cost (ie tend to involve 
neither substantial infrastructure capital investment nor dramatically changed 
operational concepts). 
 
Thus, in the ALARP region, specific safety management measures should be 
defined (eg safety monitoring, safety improvement projects, etc.) as long as such is 
reasonably practicable.   
